The openness of indoor WiFi networks makes it prone to spoofing attacks and password sharing, where undesired users may be able to access the network resources. The fundamental reason is that the actual communication range is much larger than the valid authentication range, leaving undesired users the same chance to access the network from invalid authentication range. The existing works exploit various features of wireless signals to identify the legitimate/undesired users. However, these works either rely on frequent measurement and learning on the signal features or require the modification of the access point (AP) devices. In this paper, we observe that visible light (VL) can be a good indicator to distinguish the positions of the accessing users due to its frequency diversity. Based on this observation, we propose a novel authentication framework based on VL (VL-Auth) for indoor WiFi networks, which uses the VL features as credentials and can effectively distinguish the legitimate/undesired users. VL-Auth can be easily installed on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) devices and do not require frequent measurement or learning of the VL features. We implement VL-Auth with OpenWrt and Android devices. The evaluation results show that compared to the existing works, VL-Auth can identify the legitimate/undesired users more accurately and the connection delay is also reduced.
INTRODUCTION
Indoor wireless networks (IWNs) such as WiFi networks have been one of the major access for Internet users [2, 24] . Compared with the wired networks, a WiFi network can be easily established and pervasive Internet access is provided. Besides personal networks, large scale enterprise WLANs and public WiFi networks also emerges as an important Internet access for the enterprise members and the target customers in the public places such as shopping malls and museums. For both personal IWNs and public IWNs, the target users are usually assumed to be within certain areas. For example, a shopping mall provides free WiFi access to the users inside the shopping mall instead of users outside.
However, the openness of wireless communications makes the IWNs vulnerable to password sharing and spoofing attacks, where the unauthorized or adversary users may be able to access the network. To prevent the wireless spoofing, various techniques have been proposed [22] . Most of these works employ different PHY layer information to distinguish the indoor/outdoor users to prevent the wireless spoofing [20] . For example, Tugnait [20] proposed to enhance the wireless security by using the channel state information (CSI) of a legitimate user for authentication, thus the spoofing users with different CSI will be denied by the Access Point (AP). NiFi [4] combines the angle of arrival (AoA) information and CSI to distinguish the undesired users. The rationale behind these works is that the PHY layer information (either CSI/RSSI or AoA) is a reflection of the user positions. Since the legitimate and undesired users have different positions, their CSI tend to be different as well. A key problem is that the PHY information such as CSI may be too sensitive to positions. As a result, although we can identify different users, it is hard to identify legitimate and undesired users since the legitimate users also have largely different CSI tracks. Besides, these works are usually time consuming since they require continuous training on the CSI track.
To deal with the problem, we first analyze the essential reason for the weakness of WiFi authentication as follows: Basically, the reason why spoofing attacks can be established is that the desired authentication range and the actual authentication/communication range of wireless networks are inherently the same. As a result, users in undesired area still have chance to get connected to the AP without authorization. An intuitive question is that: Is it possible to distinguish the authentication range and the communication range? If yes, the spoofing and password sharing problems can be solved from the root.
While the PHY layer information is not necessarily related to the legitimate/undesired areas, we find that the visible light (VL) can be quite useful for inferring user positions since the VL intensity and frequency are quite different for users from different positions [10, 11] (As we will analyze in Section2). Specifically, if we associate the WiFi authentication with the visible light, the legitimate users in the desired authentication area can be directly distinguished. Considering modern mobile devices are often equipped with cameras or VL sensors [ 5] , VL can be easily obtained for mobile devices in indoor WiFi authentication.
There are several challenges for associating the VL information to the WiFi authentication: 1) It is hard to incorporate VL into the authentication process without changing the current authentication protocol. 2) The temporal and spatial diversity of the VL makes it difficult to identify users by using the exact VL intensity and frequency values as the measured features for the same VL source may be varying. 3) The camera hardware diversity [19] also adds difficulty to establishing the uniqueness of the VL features as different cameras may extract different features from the same VL source.
In this paper, to address the above problem and challenges, we propose VL-Auth, a novel visible light based framework for WiFi authentication. VL-Auth has the following salient features: First, by exploiting the distinct VL features, VL-Auth is able to accurately identify the legitimate users and the unauthorized users. Second, VL-Auth is built upon the current WiFi authentication protocol and can run on the commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) devices. Third, we devise an adaptive identification scheme based on bloomfilter to adapt VL-Auth to the VL diversity and accommodate the errors from the device diversity. We implement VL-Auth with COTS WiFi APs and evaluate its performance extensively. The results show that compared to the existing works, the accuracy for identifying the unauthorized users is significantly increased (>90%) and the connection delay is reduced to that of the existing works based on password (by 30%). The major contributions of this paper include: (1) We propose a novel visible light based framework for WiFi authentication (VL-Auth), which can be easily installed on COTS devices and can effectively prevent password sharing and adversary spoofing attacks. (2) We propose an adaptive identification scheme based on bloomfilter to support large-scale indoor wireless networks with diverse VL sources. (3) We implement VL-Auth on real COTS AP devices. The evaluation results show that the accuracy of identifying legitimate/undesired users is greatly improved and the connection delay is also reduced by approximately 30%.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the motivation and challenges of this work. Section 3 presents the main deign of VL-Auth. Section 4 shows the details of implementation and evaluation of VL-Auth. Section 5 introduces and compares VL-Auth with the related works. Section 6 concludes this work and points future directions. Figure 1 shows a planar graph for a WiFi indoor network. The WiFi Access Point (AP) is placed roughly in the middle of the house. The desired valid area for authentication is the indoor areas (marked in green). However, the actual authentication range is determined by the wireless nature, which is the same as the communication range. The different area between the desired valid area and the actual authentication area is marked in red. As a result, the undesired users may be able to connect to the AP in the red area using various methods such as spoofing attacks [23] and the password sharing [13] . From this example, we can see that the location of the authentication users is a good indicator to distinguish the legitimate and undesired users. If the indoor user initiates an authentication request, the user can be identified as a legitimate user. Otherwise the user can be identified as an undesired user. Based on this observation, several works have been proposed to exploit various wireless signal information (such as the RSSI [7] , AOA [21] and Channel State Information [4] of WiFi signals) to localize the authentication users and further identify legitimate and undesired users. Although these signal features are highly affected by the user location, it is still very challenging to infer whether a user is in legitimate area or in undesired area. Different from the above works, we observe that visible light (VL) can be quite useful in distinguishing users' locations: The intensity of VL for indoor and outdoor areas can be very different. Besides, the VL frequencies of different light sources are also highly distinctive due to the hardware diversity [25] , which can also be employed to identify whether a user is initiating the authentication from a legitimate area.
MOTIVATION
We conduct an experiment to study the VL's effectiveness on distinguishing users' locations. We measured the intensity as well as the characteristic frequency (the extraction process is described in Section 3.3). Figure 2 shows the measurement result of the VL features in our lab room. There are two pairs of fluorescent lights (FLs) in the room. Figure 2 (a) shows the planar graph of the lab and the aisle in the building. The x-axis of the lab room ranges from 1 to 9. The x-axis of the aisle ranges from 9 to 12. Figure 2 (b) shows the luminous intensity for the area, measured by the digital light meter TASI TA8121 [18] . We can see that the intensity in the lab is clearly larger than that in the aisle. Hence the indoor and outdoor environments can be easily distinguished using the intensity. However, intensity alone may not be accurate enough since the intensity of some blocks in the aisle is close to that in the indoor blocks. If we rely solely on the intensity, users in these blocks may be identified as indoor users.
Fortunately, according the some recent studies on visible light and fluorescent lights (FLs) [1, 25] indicate that the frequency of different FLs are different due to the hardware diversity, even the FLs are the same type and with the same manufacturers []. Figure 4 compares the frequency values of different FLs. We can see that although the FLs are with the same manufacturer, they have different frequency. Therefore, the frequency of the FL source can be an even more accurate indicator considering that FLs are deployed almost everywhere for indoor environments [15] .
Our key idea in this paper is to exploit the VL features (intensity and frequency) for secure WiFi authentication. We will introduce our detailed design in Section 3. 
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DESIGN
To exploit the VL features for accurate user authentication in WiFi networks, we propose a novel VL-based authentication framework (VL-Auth) based on the 802.1x authentication protocol. In this section, we will first present the VL-Auth framework that incorporates VL features, then analyze the key challenges for the frame work, and finally detail the the design of the key building blocks of VL-Auth.
Framework
A major challenge for exploiting the VL features is how to incorporate the VL features in the authentication process without modifying the current authentication procol, such that the authentication scheme can be used on the commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) devices. To this end, we propose a novel authentication framework based on the 802.1x standard as shown in Figure 3 , where the VL intensity and frequency are incorporated in the EAP Response packets as credentials. The framework works as follows. The VL features of all the FLs in the desired authentication area are premeasured and stored at the authentication server. A new user first takes a picture of the FL and then connect to the target Access Point (AP). The VL features are extracted from the picture (the extraction is described in Section 3.3). Following the EAPOL process, the user first connect to the AP and negotiate the EAP method (The type of EAP based authentication it wishes the supplicant to perform) with the authentication server via AP. After that, the VL features (intensity and frequency) are fed into the EAP response packets as user credentials (username and password) to the authentication server, which are used to determine whether the target user is legitimate or undesired (the authentication scheme is described in Section 3.4). In this way, the current authentication protocol remains unchanged and thus VL-Auth has the potential to be deployed on COTS devices.
Challenges
With the above framework, we are now able to exploit the VL features for user authentication without modifying the current protocols and hardwares. However, there are several challenges to implement the above framework as follows. First, the spatial and temporal diversity of the VL features makes it difficult to directly map the VL feature values read from the mobile devices to the specific positions.
Spatial diversity. There are often multiple FLs in the desired authentication area. A user can capture the VL features from any FLs, leading to that users at the same position may take different VL features from different FLs. Figure 4 shows the frequency values of two FLs from the same manufacturer. We can see that the frequency is clearly different. However, a user from the same position can take picture of either one from the two FLs. As a result, we cannot tell a user's position from the FL frequency since a position is associated with multiple FLs. Temporal diversity. Several studies on the FL frequency has shown that the frequency of a specific FL is time varying in certain thresholds [25] . As shown in Figure 4 , the frequency of the two FLs changes over time. On one hand, the time varying characteristic makes FL frequency difficult to be used as an stable and accurate identifier for the user positions. On the other hand, the time varying characteristic is useful for preventing the password sharing problem as a single frequency reading can be out-of-dated as it changes over time.
Second, Different camera hardwares and software optimizations may lead to that different devices extract different characteristic frequency from the same FL, making it difficult to associate the FL features to the user positions.
To address the above two challenges, we propose a novel authentication scheme based on adaptive threshold and bloom filter identification. The unstable measurement and extraction results will be first converted to standardized and unique credentials (Described in Section 3.4). Then these credentials will be sent to the identification scheme (Described in Section 3.4).
VL frequency extraction
With the CMOS image sensors in modern smartphones, a picture is exposed row by row, which means the pixels from different rows are exposed in different time and the pixels within the same row are exposed at the same time. This is called the rolling shutter effect [14] . Therefore, the rows can be used as periodic samples of the FL light. If a picture is taken in t p time and it contains N rows in total, the sampling duration of each rowt r equals t p N . Combining the frame rate r f , the sample rate (samples per second, sps) can be calculated as n s = r f N . Given the setting of 1920 1080 resolution and 30 fps frame rate, the sampling rate is 30 1080 32Ksps, which is enough for reflecting the FL frequency (which is around 10KHz in our scenario). It is worth noting that the sampling based on rolling shutter effect relies solely on the hardware circuits, thus the jitter from OS and software is eliminated. We follow the extraction frame in the seminal work LiTell [25] . We first amplify the SNR by taking multiple pictures in burst mode of the camera and then concatenate the samples from all pictures into a long sequence as FFT input. After that, most spurious peaks have been eliminated and the characteristic frequency (CF) becomes the highest peak. We then use the Savitzky-Golay filter [17] to obtain a smoothed spectrum, identify the peak region and the peak position inside the region using FFT (Fast Fourier Transform). By such approach, the false positives when SNR is marginal can be avoided. Figure 5 shows the extracted characteristic frequency for two different FLs.
Authentication
The extracted FL frequency is then uploaded to the authentication server for user identification. Since a valid authentication area contains multiple FLs, the identification should be able to identify a set of frequency values. Figure 6 shows the proposed authentication scheme. The VL frequency is first uploaded to the authentication server via the access point. Then to reduce the negative impact of the spatial-temporal diversity of FL frequency and the hardware diversity, we use an adaptive threshold to "translate" the raw frequency data into the identifiable VL credentials. The credentials are then fed into the bloomfilter based user identification to determine whether the request user is from the valid authentication area or not. If the credentials are found not identical to any credential obtained from the FLs in the valid authentication area, the corresponding user is identified as an undesired user and will be rejected by the authentication server. The two building blocks, adaptive threshold and the fast identification are presented as follows. Adaptive discretization. To deal with the temporal variations of the FL frequency, we devise an adaptive threshold to "translate" the raw FL frequency data measured at the device into identifiable credential. From the initial measurement, we can obtain the frequency range for all FLs in the valid authentication area. In order to make the FL frequency identifiable, we need to convert all FL values to stable discretized values, i.e., slice the value range into several blocks and each block is represented by its starting value. However, there exists a tradeoff between accuracy and security in finding the block size: If the block size is large, the impact of the temporal variation would be reduced but some invalid frequency values may also be included into the block. Else if the block size is small, the obtained frequency value can be more close to the raw data and more accurate but it may be prone to the temporal variations. Considering the above tradeoff, we propose to control the threshold by associating the block size to the RSSI of the EAP-Response Identify packet. A stronger RSSI indicates that the user may be closer to the AP and we weigh more on reducing the temporal variations by enlarging the block size. A weaker RSSI indicates that the user may be far from the AP and is more likely to use fake FL frequency values for identification. Therefore, we need to weigh more on the accuracy and reduce the block size. Specifically, the block size s b for determining the threshold is calculated as:
where r m denotes the RSSI of the request packet measured by the AP, r h and r l denote the highest and lowest RSSI value measured in the valid authentication area, s h and s l denote the largest and smallest block size, which is set manually. When the RSSI from the user equals to r l , the block size s b = s l , which means we allow very little frequency error for the target user because the user is already suspicious due to the RSSI. Otherwise, the block size s b = s h , which means we allow relatively large error on the FL frequency for the target user since the user is expected to be very close to the AP. With the above adaptive discretization, all possible FL frequency values are converted to n f values where n f = fh −fl . When a new request is received at the authentication server, the server first obtain the frequency and RSSI values in the packet and then convert the raw frequency value to the discretized value.
Bloomftlter-based scheme for multiple VL sources We do not use database for user identification as traditional approaches due to the following reasons:
Database is time consuming and relies on the third-party database software. All the VL features for FLs in the valid authentication area can be obtained and these features are relatively stable. Instead, we devise a lightweight identification scheme based on the bloomfilter data structure [ 16] . A Bloom filter is an efficient probabilistic data structure which is used to test whether an element is a member of a set.
An empty Bloom filter is a bitmap of m bits, all set to 0. k hash functions are then used to map some elements to one of the m bit positions. In general, k is a constant smaller than m which is proportional to the number of elements to be inserted. We insert a set member to the bloomfilter by feeding it to each of the k hash functions to get k positions, which are then set to 1. When all set members are inserted, the test elements is hashed and compared to the bloomfilter. If all "1" bits in the hashed bitmap match with the corresponding bits in the bloomfilter, the element is identified as a member of the set. Otherwise, the element is a non-member. In our scenario, the bloomfilter is used to test whether the FL frequency from the user is a member of the set of frequency values for all Fls in the valid authentication area.
Since the block size for the discretization is adaptively changed, the server saves different bloomfilters. Each bloomfilter corresponds to a certain block size. When the block size is obtained from the user's request, the converted frequency value from the user is checked by the bloomfilter obtained with the same block size. If • • the check passes, it means the user is with one of the FLs in the valid authentication area and thus the user is identified as a legitimate user. Otherwise, the user is identified as an undesired user since the provided VL features do not match with those from the valid area. Technically, there are certain probability for false positive (FP) in the bloomfilter, especially for a short bloomfilter and a large number of test elements. Fortunately, since the number of FLs are usually not large and the bloomfilter is used on the authentication server, we can achieve a very low FP rate. We will present the implementation details and the evaluation result for the bloomfilter in terms of the FP rate in Section 4.
Discussion
VL-Auth can be widely used on devices with cameras such as smartphones [5] and Google Glass [8] . Comparison. From the users' perspective, VL-Auth introduces several differences from the traditional 802.1x as follows. First, the users do not need to input the username or password for the WiFi access. Instead, they are required to take a picture of one FL in the indoor environment using the feature extraction app (we have developed the app for Android devices and released it at http://mobinets.org/demos/vl-auth-release.apk ). This difference eliminates the user input delay but introduces the feature extraction delay. Second, the setup of the networks requires more efforts because the VL features of the FLs in the desired authentication area need to be pre-measured and stored at the server. However, it is worth mentioning that unless the FLs in the desired area are changed, such measurement will not be needed after the setup. Third, the authentication scheme do not use database. Instead, it uses the bloomfilter for fast identification which is expected to reduce the delay at the server side.
Photo/Password sharing. A security concern is that an undesired user can somehow get the picture of the FLs in the desired authentication area and then use the extracted FL frequency for authentication. Such attack is similar with the password sharing in traditional WiFi networks. VL-Auth is able to distinguish such users in very high probability due to the following reason: There is an error between the measured frequency and the valid frequency due to the time varying characteristic of the FL. Such error is then filtered by our adaptive threshold. Since the undesired user often attempts to connect the AP in a position further than the legitimate users, the RSSI-related threshold of the frequency for these users will be very strict. To use the shared photo for connection, the undesired user needs to use a signal amplifier and carefully tune the signal strength.
EVALUATION
We implement VL-Auth in Nexus 5 smartphones (client app for feature extraction), a PHICOMM K2 Access Point with OpenWRT [6] , and an Ubuntu authentication server with WiFiDog [12] (the authentication scheme with adaptive discretization and bloomfilter). The Android app is available at http://mobinets.org/demos/vl-authrelease.apk. Figure 7 shows the VL-Auth client APP for Android phones. The user is guided to take a picture of the nearest FL for WiFi connection, instead of manually find and input the username/password. We use two adjacent rooms with four FLs as the desired authentication area to conduct the experiment. All users that connect to the WiFi from the two rooms are desired users. We also test the photo sharing attack from outside the two rooms: An undesired user first take a picture of a FL in the desired authentication area and then try to connect to the network from invalid authentication areas in outdoors.
We mainly compare the performance of VL-Auth with the traditional password-based authentication using 802.11, in terms of the connection success/failure rate for both legitimate and undesired users, and the connection delay under different scenarios. Besides, we also evaluate the two main building blocks of VL-Auth -feature extraction and adaptive authentication in terms of the delay and time-space efficiency. Figure 8 (a) and Figure 8(b) shows the connection success rate for legitimate users from different picturing angles and distances. We can see that, 1) generally the success rate for the connection from legitimate users is high (above 95%). 2) As the distance between camera and FL increases, the success rate decreases. The reason is two fold: First, we rely on the rolling shutter effect for frequency extraction. When the camera is far from the FL, there are fewer rows of pixels that capture the FL. As a result, the number of samples decreases when the distance is larger. Second, since our AP is deployed near the FLs, if the user is further from the FL he/she is likely to be further from the AP. As a result, the block size in feature discretization for the user will be very small, which allows little error on the frequency measurement. Then some user with random error on the frequency extraction can be rejected by the authentication server. 3) As the angle of photo increases, the success rate lightly decreases. The reason is two-fold: First, the rate decreases because when we change the angle, the distance between the camera and the FL changes at the same time. Therefore, the rate decreases. Second, the FL fixture is cylinder and thus changing angles will not effect the amount of FL samples. Therefore, the reduction is much smaller than that with distance. Figure 8 (c) depicts the success rate of WiFi connection from undesired users with the shared photo. The success rate is generally under 2%. Specifically, when the undesired user is next to the wall (nearest to the indoor AP), the successful rate is approximately 2%. The reason is that, the cross-wall wireless signals significantly fade, which lead to a very strict threshold for checking the uploaded FL frequency. Therefore, although the same photo of the FL is used, the successful rate for the undesired users are still highly limited. Figure 9 compares the authentication delay of VL-Auth and the password-based approach. We set a ten-digit password for the AP and let ten volunteers input the password printed on the router to connect to the WiFi. It is worth noting that the volunteers are unaware of the purpose of the experiment. After that, they are asked to use the VL-Auth mobile APP to capture the FL and connect to the WiFi. We can see that for all volunteers, 1) the connection delay using VL-Auth is under ten seconds. Meanwhile, the connection delay of the password based authentication greatly varies. 2) Compared to the password based approach, the delay is reduced using VL-Auth. Specifically, the delay for volunteers 4, 8 and 9 greatly decreases (the reduction is more than 30%). The reason is that taking a picture is much quicker than manually input a 10-digit password for these volunteers, especially for volunteers 4, 8 and 9. We can infer that if the password length is very small, the delay of VL-Auth can be similar or larger than that of the password based approach. Otherwise, VL-Auth decreases the connection delay. 3) From Figure 9 , we can also see that the main contribution to the overall delay is the taking picture and feature extraction procedures, which constitute over 60% of the total delay. While the delay of taking pictures is determined by the users, the feature extraction delay can be further reduced. Currently we use the OpenCV [3] on the smartphone to process the pictures, which incurs unnecessary delay due to the Java implementation [25] . We will focus on optimizing the feature extraction in our future work. Figure 10 shows the false positive rate of the bloom filter. The length of the bloomfilter in our experiment is 59907 bytes. We can see that the achieved FP rate remains below 0.2% when the number of different keys increases to 1000. Considering the different keys associated with the FLs, the bloomfilter is highly reliable for both small scale indoor networks and large scale enterprise networks.
Evaluation results
RELATED WORKS
To prevent the undesired users from joining the WiFi, various schemes have been proposed for user identification. According to the information used, we can divide the existing works into two categories: CSI/RSSI based approaches and AoA (angle-of-arrival) based. Works based on CSI/RSSI mainly include [7, 20] . Faria and Cheriton [7] employed the RSS observed by nearby APs as client identifiers, such that the undesired users with different "signalprint" can be filtered out. Tugnait [20] proposed to enhance the wireless security by using the channel state information (CSI) of a legitimate user for authentication, thus the spoofing users with different CSI will be denied by the Access Point (AP). Works based on AoA mainly include [4, 21, 22] . Xiong et al. proposed to exploit the angle-of-arrival (AoA) information for user identification [21] and further improved the AoA signature specificity to form the unique identifier for each legitimate user [22] . NiFi [4] combines the angle of arrival (AoA) information and CSI to distinguish the undesired users. The rationale behind these works is that the PHY layer information (either CSI/RSSI or AoA) is a reflection of the user positions. Since the legitimate and undesired users have different positions, their CSI tend to be different as well. A key problem to this work is that, CSI may be so sensitive to positions that the legitimate users also have different CSI tracks and the undesired users still have chance to have similar CSI track as the legitimate users due to the physical environment.
Different from the existing works, to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to exploit the visible light (VL) features as the identifiers for the legitimate users. Compared to the PHY layer information such as CSI/RSSI and AoA, VL is a more accurate indicator of the user position for indoor WiFi networks and does not require massive training process. Besides, it does not rely the MIMO or extra antennas for collecting the PHY information.
Google Lens [9] is a new technique that connect to WiFi using the mobile camera. It uses the OCR to recognize the username and password printed on the AP routers and then proceed the WiFi connection process. Although the use of camera saves time for the password input, it does not improve the security of the WiFi networks and the undesired users can also easily access the network with shared photos of the password.
False positive
In this paper, we propose an novel authentication framework based on visible light (VL) features for indoor WiFi networks (VL-Auth). VL-Auth exploits the VL features as user credentials to identify the users from the desired and undesired positions. To deal with the spatial-temporal diversity of the VL frequency, we propose adaptive discretization and the bloomfilter based authentication, which can achieve accurate and lightweight user identification. We implement VL-Auth on COTS devices and evaluate its performance in comparison with existing approaches. The results show that our work is effective in identifying the undesired users and achieves similar connection delay. Our future work focuses on 1) reducing the feature extraction delay and 2) using the ambient light sensor instead of the cameras, such that no extra overhead will be incurred for the user.
